This paper studies whether contest organisers should reveal the number of contestants. Combining theory and laboratory evidence, we show that the optimal disclosure policy depends on the convexity of participants’ effort costs. The results highlight how contest design should vary across settings such as innovation competitions and production environments.
This paper examines how tournament reward structures affect contestants’ risk-taking. Theory and laboratory evidence show that unequal prize allocation and larger contestant pools both increase risk-taking, but through different channels. The findings speak to the design of incentives in workplaces, R&D races, politics, and sports.
This project studies prize allocation rules in team contests where teams compete across multiple component battles. We show theoretically and experimentally that when teams are sufficiently asymmetric, a biased majority rule with a head start for the weaker team can maximise total effort. The results help explain effective prize design in R&D and technology competitions.
We compare three two-stage auction mechanisms in settings with costly bidder entry. The evidence suggests that indicative bidding, which uses non-binding early bids to screen entrants, delivers weakly higher revenue and welfare than the alternatives, partly by increasing bidder willingness to participate.
This project experimentally studies how prize allocation affects effort in all-pay contests under different cost structures. The results closely align with theoretical predictions on when winner-take-all versus greater prize sharing is most effective.
This study investigates how the role of luck in outcomes shapes individuals’ willingness to seek feedback. It examines whether favourable or unfavourable noisy outcomes encourage feedback avoidance, and also explores implications for gender gaps in competitive environments and workforce outcomes.
For papers, ongoing work, or collaboration-related enquiries, please contact laura.liu@rmit.edu.au.